Marty: Bullet train or the Boondoggle Express?

In November 2008, California voters passed Proposition 1A, the High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act, 53 percent to 47 percent. It authorized $9.95 billion in general obligation bonds to help, ostensibly, fund a $40 billion, 800-mile bullet train. Now, only three years later with nothing built the estimated costs have skyrocketed to $98.5 billion, the completion date has been pushed out nine years to 2033, and the maximum annual ridership estimate has shrunk by 18 million. At what point do the misstatements or gross errors that formed the original premise of Prop 1A invalidate the election results?
The new numbers are getting closer to those originally put forward by the project’s critics and further away from the initial low-ball proposal. It also brings us closer to the central argument – whether the high-speed rail system can pay its on-going costs in spite of reduced ridership and lower fares. That assumption is the central underpinning of the High-Speed Rail Authority business plan. Many of the same critics who were right on the capital costs predict the system will require massive fare subsidies, essentially forever. The need to tack a bunch of taxpayer dollars on every regular ticket would have a serious negative impact on public support.
High-speed mass transit can work under the right circumstances, but those are infrequent in the U.S. and rare in California either now or in the foreseeable future. The critical factors are population, density, the door-to-door time, costs and lifestyle. Unfortunately, they all work in the wrong direction for us. The populations and densities are too low. The door-to-door times are poor compared to air travel. The costs are high. And the lifestyles do not match our desires.
Most Americans in the West are wedded to their personal vehicles and are likely to stay that way as long as gasoline is artificially cheap. Few politicians are going to survive recommending the U.S. bring gas prices to its real value, around $8 a gallon, the cost in Europe and Asia where high-speed rail is popular. There is a huge difference in the relative cost and convenience of owning and operating an automobile in those societies and here.
I’m not against spending on infrastructure, but I believe that Californians should get their money’s worth. High-speed rail, though, will not significantly reduce or delay our pressing need for new and better roads.
Then it comes to believability and personal involvement. I’ve seen the blinding light that emanates from the sun of self-interest be it philosophical, political or economic. There are those who want the project no matter what the cost or rationale. The High-Speed Rail Authority was not commissioned to say no; their charge is to find a way – any way – to say yes.
The other major danger is that massive projects become self-justifying. Once we have sunk our hopes and dreams and billions of dollars in it, those billions become the justification for more billions. As Boston’s Big Dig went from $4 billion to $14 billion, the cry became “we’ve come so far, we can’t quit now.” If we build a section for $40 billion and the revenue does not meet projections, will we abandon the bleeding wound – never!
That type of blind argument is already in play in the Central Valley where, say supporters, “we have to build the first section here to get federal funds before the deadline,” even though that makes no sense as a starting point.
What is the alternative? If supporters believe that they can build it within budget, on schedule, and make a profit with fewer riders and lower fares, they should be prepared to prove it. They should build a much shorter system – let’s say the 150 miles from the north Los Angeles basin to San Diego. Make that work and pay for itself and we can talk about the rest. If you can’t make it work there, you can’t make it work anywhere.
Marty Richman is a Hollister resident and writes a column for Tuesday’s Free Lance.